北大经济史学名家系列讲座
第221讲
《管子·轻重》的工具理性与价值理性
主讲人：王华春（北京师范大学政府管理学院教授）
主持人：庄顺典（Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口经济史学系博士生）
评论人：
周建波（Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口经济史学系主任、教授）
张亚光（Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口副院长、长聘副教授）
时间：2025年3月6日（周四） 12:00-14:00
地点：Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口301会议室
主讲人简介：
王华春，2002年毕业于复旦大学Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口经济思想史专业，获博士学位，现为北京师范大学政府管理学院教授、博士生导师，研究方向为公共经济与公共财政、经济思想史等。曾主持国家社会科学基金项目2项，出版专著、教材数部。曾获北京师范大学高等教育教学优秀成果一等奖，北京师范大学“十佳辅导员”等荣誉。
主办单位：
Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口经济史学系
Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口社会经济史研究所
Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口外国经济学说研究中心
北大经院工作坊第1043场
Strategic Sampling from Manipulable Data
微观理论经济学工作坊
主讲人：Xianwen Shi (Professor at University of Toronto)
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛
（北大国发院）汪浩、邢亦青
（北大光华）翁翕、刘烁
时间：2025年3月6日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口302会议室
主讲人简介：
Xianwen Shi is a Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto. He is an expert in mechanism design and information design, known for his work on mechanism design without transfers, with limited commitment, with endogenous information acquisition, or with endogenous information disclosure, as well as for his work on contest design. He has published papers on leading economic journals such as American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, and Review of Economic Studies. His current research focuses on information disclosure and manipulation in strategic dynamic contexts.
摘要：
We study a game between a decision maker and a data manipulator. The decision maker sequentially samples data to learn a binary state (high or low), while the manipulator can distort the data at a cost. The decision maker chooses when to stop sampling and act, aiming to match the true state, while the manipulator prefers the high action regardless of the state and strategically decides when and how intensely to manipulate. In equilibrium, the decision maker adopts a deterministic stopping rule, while the manipulator initially refrains from manipulation and later randomizes between full manipulation and abstention. Manipulation consistently harms the decision maker's decision quality and payoff, though it does not always benefit the manipulator. Notably, manipulation can reverse the decision maker's preference for sampling methods: while sequential sampling is superior without manipulation, static sampling may outperform it when manipulation is possible. This finding highlights the trade-offs between efficiency and robustness in adversarial environments.
北大经院工作坊第1044场
Industrial Water Pollution, Agricultural Productivity and Labor Reallocation: Evidence from China
生态、环境与气候变化经济学工作坊
主讲人：赖汪洋（Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口现代农学院副教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）季曦
（北大国发院）邢剑炜
时间：2025年3月7日（周五）10:30-12:00
地点： Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口国家发展研究院承泽园131教室
主讲人简介：
赖汪洋，Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口现代农学院，中国农业政策研究中心，副教授。文章发表于American Economics of Agricultural Economics，Journal of Environmental Economics and Management，Journal of Urban Economics和Nature Human Behaviour 等期刊。主持国家自然科学基金面上项目，青年科学基金等项目。
摘要：
This article estimates the effect of industrial water pollution on agricultural productivity and its further consequences on labor reallocation in China, using a spatial design that exploits a high-resolution hydrological network. We show that industrial wastewater discharged within 150 km upstream significantly increases local water pollution and reduces crop productivity. The negative externality is mainly caused by firms in the highly polluting industries, and the pollution-induced productivity shock is magnified if the local village is closer to the river, has lower groundwater availability, and receives less precipitation. Rural households increasingly engage in non-farm work and migration in response to the environmental shock. Further quantification indicates substantial overall costs on food production and highly distributional effects on labor reallocation.
北大经院工作坊第1045场
Optimal Central Redistribution with Decentralized Redistribution
发展与公共财政工作坊
主讲人：李文健（浙江大学百人计划研究员）
参与老师：
（北大经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇、年永威
（北大国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健、黄清扬
（北大光华）张晓波、仇心诚
时间：2025年3月7日（周五）10:30-12:00
地点：Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口国家发展研究院承泽园245教室
主讲人简介：
李文健，浙江大学百人计划研究员，博士生导师，Kaiyun体育官方网站全站入口经济学博士。研究领域为公共财政与政治经济学。主要是最优税收与税负归宿理论；财税与社保制度设计。研究成果发表于American Economic Review (conditional accept)，Journal of Public Economics、《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》等期刊。主持2项国家自然科学基金，1项社科重大子课题，1项自科专项子课题。
摘要：
Is decentralized redistribution desirable for the nation? This paper studies optimal central income tax under strategic local governments who design local income taxes and compete tax with each other. It develops a sufficient-statistics approach to the tax (contract) design under multi-level principal-agent problems with tax (contract) competition. It provides a concise ABC-nest-ABC tax rule. The classic Diamond ABC is integrated into a novel Pigouvian ABC, comprising: (i) economic weight for each region, (ii) inter-government objective inconsistency, and (iii) the classic Diamond ABC. Our formula demonstrates precisely how the central government can engage local governments and achieve the optimal tax system using empirically observable statistics. Unlike the canonical Mirrleesian tax, this optimal tax specifically addresses inter-government objectives inconsistencies as well as fiscal externality. A simple quantitative analysis of the U.S. indicates that decentralized redistribution is essentially harmless for the nation, while it addresses local needs. It is much desirable when intra-region inequality is severe. The central income tax is essential for redistribution, even with free inter-region fiscal transfers and consistent preference between governments. In contrast, implementing region-specific central income taxation would only slightly improve national welfare.
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：文婷
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
